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I 
In a discussion note titled "Putnam's Argument 
Against Realism" 1 John Koethe attempts to refute 
Putnam's main argument against a view which Putnam 
calls 'Metaphysical Realism'. (This argument was first 
put forward by Putnam in Realism and Reason", 2 and in 
the philosophical literature has come to be called the 
model-theoretic or modelling argument against 
Metaphysical Realism). While I am not at all convinced 
by Putnam's argument, I find Koethe's refutation of the 
argument even less convincing. In this note I attempt 
to show where Koethe has gone wrong. 
According to Putnam, Metaphysical Realism (here-
after abbreviated as M.R.)is more a picture or a model 
than a theory. It purports to be "a model of the rela-
tion of any correct theory to all or part of THE 
WORLD." 3 According to this model, "there has to be a 
determinate relation of reference between terms in L 
and pieces (or sets of pieces) of THE WORLD." 4 The 
most important consequence of M. R. is that truth 
becomes radically non-epistemic; that is to say, ac-
cording to M. R., even a theory that is ideal in every 
way might turn out to be false. This consequence of M. 
R. Putnam finds to be unintelligible, and the modelling 
argument is designed to show just that, viz. that this 
consequence of M. R. lacks intelligibility. 
Let T| be an ideal theory by our lights. Now, the 
argument against the intelligibility of the claim that 
T, might be false runs thus: 
I assume THE WORLD has (or can be broken into) 
infinitely many pieces. I also assume T, says 
there are infinitely many things (so in this 
respect T t is "objectively right" about THE WORLD). Now T t is consistent (by hypothesis) and has (only) infinite models. So by the complete-
ness theorem (in its model theoretic form), T, 
has a model of every infinite cardinality. Pick 
a model M of the same cardinality as THE WORLD. 
Map the individuals of M one-to-one into the 
pieces of THE WORLD, and use the mapping to 
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define relations of M directly in THE WORLD. The 
result is a satisfaction relation S A T — a 
'correspondence' between the terms of L and sets 
of pieces of THE WORLD—such that the theory T ( 
comes out true—true of THE WORLD—provided we 
just interpret 'true' as TRUE (SAT). 5 
Furthermore, according to Putnam, there are no 
grounds for ruling out SAT as an unintended corre-
spondence. And, therefore, "the supposition that even 
an 'ideal' theory (from a pragmatic point of view) 
might really be false appears to collapse into un-
intelligibility." 8 
II 
It is this argument that Koethe attempts to refute. 
Koethe's attack is focused on the notion of an ideal 
theory invoked in the above argument. His contention 
is that either there is no coherent conception of an 
ideal theory which suits Putnam's argument or it is a 
sense of ideal theory such that in this sense of an 
ideal theory the realist is not obliged to hold that 
even an ideal theory might be false. Crucial to the 
argument for this disjunction is Koethe's claim that in 
order for the model-theoretic argument to work the 
theory T, has to be one that is unrevisable-in-
principle. And Koethe goes on to argue that if this 
last claim is true, then an important ingredient in the 
notion of ideal theory that Putnam requires for his ar-
gument has to be unrevisability. According to Koethe, 
it is this necessary ingredient in that notion of ideal 
theory that Putnam needs which makes certain ways of 
understanding the notion of an ideal theory, which may 
be otherwise unobjectionable, inadequate for Putnam's 
purposes. On the other hand, according to Koethe, if 
one constructs a notion of an ideal theory that has 
this ingredient and is otherwise unobjectionable then 
it is not clear that on this way of explicating (or 
constructing) the notion of an ideal theory the Meta-
physical Realist is committed to holding that the ideal 
theory might be false. 
My claim is that Koethe has gone wrong in holding 
that in order for the model-theoretic argument to work 
the theory Tt has to be one that is unrevisable-in-principle, and as a consequence Koethe has unfairly 
dismissed certain conceptions of ideal theory as inade-
quate for Putnam's purposes. 
Let us consider Koethe's argument for the claim 
that any theory for which the model-theoretic argument 
works has to be unrevisable-in-principle. His strategy 
is "first try to apply the argument not to an ideal 
theory, but to an arbitrary member of a sequence of 
theories each of which is, in the course of time, ac-
cepted and then abandoned in favor of a successor." 7 
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Let T. be an arbitrary member of such a sequence of 
theories. Now let us see if we can render unintelligi-
ble the claim that T. might be false by applying the 
model-theoretic argument to it. Such an application 
would run as follows: 
Pick a model M (we would argue) of the same car-
dinality as THE WORLD. Map M's domain one-to-one 
into pieces of THE WORLD, and use this mapping to 
define the relation of M directly in THE WORLD. 
We now have a relation SAT between the terms of 
the language in which T. is expressed and THE 
WORLD, on the basis of which we can define a 
property TRUE (SAT) such that T. comes out true 
only if we interpret 'true* as TRUE (SAT). And 
(we would claim) there are no legitimate grounds 
for rejecting this interpretation of 'true* as 
unintended. 8 
However, according to Koethe, there is a reply to 
this argument. He claims that there are grounds for 
rejecting TRUE (SAT) as an acceptable interpretation of 
•true 1 for T.. There are two lines of argument that 
Koethe gives for this claim between which he does not 
distinguish, and he may well be confusing these two 
lines. 9 They are: 
Argument A ) : If holders of T. accept TRUE (SAT) as the 
intended interpretation of 'true' for T., 
they arrive at an absurd consequence, 
and, therefore, they will have legitimate 
grounds for rejecting it as the intended 
interpretation. 1 0 
And 
Argument B ) : Holders of T. are in a position to know 
at t that later theorists at t+1, if 
there are any, will have to reject TRUE 
(SAT) as the intended interpretation for 
their theory (that is, T t + 1 ) and! that 
gives the holders of T. legitimate basis 
for ruling out TRUE (SAT) as the intended 
interpretation of 'true' for T ^ . 1 1 
It is worth pointing out in passing that Koethe has 
concerned himself entirely with showing that the hold-
ers of T t will have legitimate reasons for ruling out TRUE (SAT) as unintended rather than trying to show 
that it is we, the constructors of this thought ex-
periment, the philosopher-theorists, who will have le-
gitimate reasons for ruling out TRUE (SAT) as unin-
tended. But Putnam's argument has to do with the lat-
ter claim rather than the former. So if Koethe's argu-
ment is not to be a complete non sequitur some such 
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principle as the following must be true: We can decide 
whether it makes sense to suppose that a theory T might 
be false (or decide that a certain interpretation of 
•true' for T is unintended) by deciding whether the 
holders of T will have legitimate grounds for thinking 
it makes sense to suppose that T might be false (or, by 
deciding whether the holders of T will have legitimate 
grounds for rejecting that interpretation as unin-
tended). However, this principle is not always true. 
Whether someone has legitimate grounds for thinking 
something depends on what they know and what they are 
ignorant of. So this principle will be false whenever 
we, the constructors of the thought-experiment have a 
relevant piece of information that the holders of the 
theory do not possess. What gives them legitimate 
grounds for holding something in their ignorance of 
this piece of information need not give us legitimate 
grounds for holding the same thing in our knowledge of 
this piece of information. 
I shall briefly sketch and amplify the line of ar-
gument A and show that it is unsound, and then I shall 
go on to consider argument B in some detail. 
Argument A 
1) TRUE (SAT) is an acceptable interpretation of 
'true* just in case SAT is an acceptable interpre-
tation of 'reference' or 'satisfaction'. 
1') Suppose SAT is an acceptable interpretation of 
'reference' for T f c. 
2) T f c will be replaced at a later time t+1 by T t + 1 . 
3) Referents of terms are for the most part preserved 
across change of theories. (Koethe borrows this 
premise from Putnam). 
4) Therefore, if SAT is taken as the intended relation 
of reference between the terms of T f c and reality, then this must be the intended relation of ref-
erence between these same terms as occurring in 
T f c + 1 and reality (from 3 ) . 
5) Since T.^, is inconsistent with T«., T«... must be FALSE (ski). t t + 1 
6) Holders of T f c + 1 , if there are any, will be in a position to know 1-5. 
7) Therefore, if SAT is taken as the intended inter-
pretation of 'reference' for T., then holders of 
T. . will have to accept SAT as the intended inter-
pretation of 'reference' for T,.+1 . And so they 
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will be holding a theory they know to be false. 
(From 4, 5 and 6 ) . 
8) Holders of T f c are , at t, in a position to know 1-7. 
9) Therefore, holders of T f c are in a position to real-
ize that if SAT is taken as the intended inter-
pretation of 'reference 1 for T., they have to allow 
as a consequence that later rational theorists, if 
there are any, will have to accept a theory they 
(the later theorists) know to be false. (From 7 
and 8 ) . 
10) But this consequence is an absurdity. 
11) Therefore, holders of T. are in a position to know 
at t that if SAT is taken as the intended inter-
pretation of 'reference', it leads to an absurdity. 
(From 9 and 10). 
12) Therefore, this knowledge gives them (the holders 
of T.) legitimate grounds for rejecting SAT as the 
intended interpretation of reference for T. and for 
rejecting TRUE (SAT) as the intended interpretation 
of 'true' for T f c. 
The most crucial part of this argument is the claim 
(number 7 above) that if SAT is taken as the intended 
interpretation of 'reference' for T., then holders of 
T. , will have to accept it for their theory too, even 
though they know that that makes T . + 1 FALSE (SAT). But why should they have to do that? Being rational, they 
will reject SAT as the intended interpretation of 
•reference' for T t + , . And holders of T f c can figure out as much. So why does Koethe think that holders of T. 
are committed to supposing that if SAT is taken by them 
as the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T. , 
then holders of T f c + 1 have to hold SAT to be the in-tended interpretation of 'reference' for T f c + . too? (It is not clear Koethe holds this. But fie does not 
clearly distinguish between this line of argument and 
line B, which will be described b e l o w . ) 1 2 
The only answer that Koethe can give is that anyone 
who holds premise 3 and also holds that SAT is the in-
tended interpretation of 'reference' for T f c is commit-ted to holding that SAT is the intended interpretation 
of reference for T f c - (since reference of most terms is supposed to be preserved in the transition from T t to T f c + 1 ) . But 3 is open to two interpretations: 
3') For most terms that the new theory ( T t + ] ) and the old theory (T.) have in common, these terms as oc-
curring in the new theory should (for the most 
part) be assigned the same referents as are as-
signed to these terms as occurring in the old 
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theory by an assignment of referents according to 
(or, in light of) the earlier theory (T f c). 
And 
3".) For most terms that the new theory ( T . + 1 ) and the old theory (T ) have in common, these terms as oc-
curring in the new theory should (for the most 
part) be assigned the same referents as are as-
signed to these terms as occurring in the old 
theory by an assignment of referents according to 
(or, in light of) the later theory ( T f c + 1 ) . 
Notice that 3' is false, whereas 3" may well be 
true. And more to the point, it is not 3' that Putnam 
holds, but 3 " . 1 3 So if Koethe is to use a picture of 
theory-evolution acceptable to Putnam, he must hold the 
second interpretation of 3. But also notice that for 
the above argument to go through Koethe requires 3' 
rather than 3". It is only those who hold 3' who are 
committed (on holding SAT to be the intended inter-
pretation of 'reference' for T. ) to holding that SAT be 
the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T t + i too. On the other hand, those who hold 3" will con-
clude that later theorists will probably reject SAT as 
the intended interpretation for T t + i « a n < * they will also conclude that (since later theorists hold 3") 
later theorist will reject SAT as the intended inter-
pretation of 'reference' for T. too. So the absurd 
consequence that is supposed to follow from acceptance 
(by holders of T.) of SAT as the intended relation of 
•reference' for T. will not follow and, hence, 7 and 9 
above will be false. So, in conclusion, if 3 is under-
stood as 3', the argument above will be unacceptable to 
Putnam (and is probably unsound) and if 3 if understood 
as 3", the argument above will be invalid because in 
that case 7 does not follow from 4, 5 and 6 or any of 
the preceding propositions. 
The other line of argument, which I have called 
Argument B, makes use of the second interpretation of 
3. It runs as follows: 
Argument B 
1) TRUE (SAT) is an acceptable interpretation of 
'true' for T. just in case SAT is an acceptable in-
terpretation of 'reference' or 'satisfaction' for 
2) T f c will be replaced at a later time t+1 by T f c + 1 . 
3") For most terms that the new theory (T. . ) and the 
old theory (T.) have in common, these terms as oc-
curring in the new theory should (for the most 
part) be assigned the same referents as are as-
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signed to those terms as occurring in the old 
theory by an assignment of referents according to 
(or, in light of) the later theory ( T^+i)* 
4) Since T. . is inconsistent with T., if T r is TRUE 
(SAT) theft AT t + 1 must be FALSE (SAT)7 
5) Holders of T f c ,, if there are any, are in a po-
sition to know 1-5. 
6) Therefore, being rational creatures, they will re-
ject SAT as the intended interpretation of T t + 1 . 
7) Therefore, they will reject SAT as the intended in-
terpretation of Tj. (From 3", 5 and 6 ) . 
8) Holders of T f c are ,at t, in a position to know 1-7. 
In particular, they know that holders of T. . (if 
there are any) will reject SAT as the intended in-
terpretation of T f c. 
9) This gives holders of T. legitimate grounds at t 
for rejecting SAT as the intended interpretation of 
'reference* for T t and for rejecting TRUE (SAT) as 
the intended interpretation of 'true' for T f c. 
Furthermore, Koethe holds that it is not necessary 
that holders of T. know that T f c will be replaced by 
Tt+l' i f c * s enough that for all they know it is possi-
ble that T. will be replaced by T . + 1 - So, according to him, the above argument should work against any theory 
T. such that its adherents are not in a position to 
know that it won't be replaced. That is to say, ac-
cording to Koethe, this refutation works against any 
application of the model-theoretic argument to a theory 
that is open to revision. Only an application of the 
model-theoretic argument to a theory which is not open 
to revision—is unrevisable, and unrevisable in 
principle—escapes this refutation, or so Koethe 
claims. Therefore, a property an ideal theory such as 
T t for which the model-theoretic argument is supposed to work has to be that T t is unrevisable. Thus Koethe says, "it is important to emphasize that this reply 
does not require that T. actually have an incompatible 
successor which is operationally verified at t+1. It 
is enough that the proponents of T. are not in a posi-
tion to know, at t, that it will not, and hence have to 
admit the possibility that rational later speakers will 
accept a theory inconsistent with T t . " M 
Ill 
The suspicious part in the above argument (B) is 9. 
Why should the fact (leave alone the possibility) that 
someone else is later going to reject their (i.e. the-
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holders-of-T 's) interpretation of 'reference' be suf-
ficient reason for holders of T f c to reject their own interpretation of 'reference'? Isn't this slavish def-
erence to the views of others uncalled for? Yet that 
is what 9 claims, and that is what Koethe would present 
to us as the paradigm of rationality. Clearly, Koethe 
couldn't have meant this. 
Let us suppose that for an interpretation to be in-
tended is for it to have some property (or set of 
properties) F, and for an interpretation to be unin-
tended is for it to lack F. Let us also suppose that 
later theorists are in a better position (than holders 
of T.) to know whether SAT as an interpretation of 
'reference' for T. has F or not. Now, if holders of T. 
know that such later theorists who are in a better 
position to know whether SAT has F or not will 
pronounce that SAT lacks F, then in that case this 
rejection of SAT by later theorists will provide hold-
ers of T t legitimate grounds for rejecting SAT as the intended interpretation of 'reference' for T f c. But holders of T. are not likely to be in a position to 
know any such thing. At most, they can only speculate 
and conjecture this—slim grounds for rejecting their 
own interpretation as unintended. And even if we waive 
this objection, the above case only shows that where 
revision of a theory by later better-informed theorists 
(better-informed among other things about which inter-
pretations of 'reference' for earlier theories possess 
F and which do not) occurs, there the holders of 
previous theories (who know that such a revision will 
take place) may take this future revision to be legiti-
mate grounds for rejecting their interpretation of 
'reference' as unintended. 
But what about cases where no such revision of the 
theory takes place? Will the holders of that theory 
then have legitimate grounds for rejecting their inter-
pretation of 'reference' for that theory as unintended? 
Koethe thinks that they will so long as they do not 
know that the theory won't be revised. That is, so 
long as the holders of T. have to admit the possibility 
that T t may come to be revised, this bare possibility gives them legitimate grounds for rejecting their in-
terpretation as unintended. But surely this is far too 
strong. Why should the possibility that some better-
informed person is going to reject my interpretation as 
lacking F give me reason to think that my interpreta-
tion in fact lacks F? Surely, there is nothing irra-
tionalen holding some proposition p and also admitting 
that it is possible—barely possible—that someone 
wiser may someday hold not-p. (And is this possibility 
ever absent? So, then, is it never rational for us to 
hold anything!) It is entirely incomprehensible to me 
why Koethe should think otherwise. Yet Koethe does 
say: 
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[the holders of T.] have a legitimate basis on 
which to reject the interpretation of 'true' as 
TRUE (SAT)—namely, that later speakers of the 
language (should there be any), or they them-
selves at some later time, probably could not ac-
cept i t . 1 5 
And he goes on immediately to emphasize that 
this reply does not require that T. actually have 
an incompatible successor which is operationally 
verified at t+1. It is enough that the propo-
nents of T. are not in a position to know, at t, 
that it will not, and hence have to admit the 
possibility that rational later speakers will ac-
cept a theory inconsistent with T. . They cannot 
admit this possibility and at the same time ac-
cept the interpretation of 'reference' as SAT . . 
. •. 1 6 (my emphasis) 
The situation so far is thus: Putnam has given an 
argument—the model theoretic argument—applied to an 
'ideal' theory T x which argument is designed to show that it is unintelligible to hold that that theory 
might be ideal and yet be false. Koethe applies this 
argument to a theory T. which is an arbitrary member of 
a sequence of theories arranged chronologically and 
which is (therefore?) supposed to be less than Ideal 
(Why Koethe assumes that such a theory is less than 
ideal I do not know). Then he produces an argument (or 
a confusion of two distinct lines of argument) 1 7 to 
show that in this case there is a way of ruling out 
TRUE (SAT) as an unintended interpretation of 'true' 
for T. and so the model-theoretic argument cannot be 
applied to T.. He thinks that this argument of his 
succeeds (in refuting the model-theoretic argument) in 
every case of a theory where the holders of that theory 
have to admit the possibility that that theory may come 
to be replaced by another theory (inconsistent with 
it). And so he claims that the model-theoretic 
argument works, if it works at all, only when applied 
to a theory that is unrevisable from the point of view 
of those who hold it. Then he goes on to argue that 
there can be no such theory. 
In my response to Koethe I have been concerned to 
show that he is wrong in maintaining that his argument 
(A or B above, or a confused mixture of the two) suc-
ceeds in showing that the model-theoretic argument 
fails in every case of a theory where the holders of 
that theory have to admit the possibility that that 
theory may come to be replaced by another theory (in-
consistent with it). I claim that all that Koethe's 
argument has succeeded in showing is that the model-
theoretic argument fails in every case of a theory 
where the holders of that theory know that beings wiser 
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than them will in fact replace that theory by another 
theory (inconsistent with the earlier theory). And so, 
I claim that Koethe is wrong in holding that if the 
model-theoretic argument is to work in the case of an 
ideal theory such as T t , then T| must be unrevisable from the point of view of those who hold it. It is not 
that I think Putnam's notion of an ideal theory is 
clear or unproblematic; however, I do think that Koethe 
unfairly saddles Putnam's notion of an ideal theory 
with unrevisability. And for this reason Koethe's at-
tack misses its mark. Putnam's answer to Koethe should 
be that the ideal theory does not have to be unrevisa-
ble, it is enough that the holders of the ideal theory 
do not know that beings wiser than them will replace 
their theory by a theory inconsistent with the ideal 
theory. And we, the constructors of the thought-
experiment, can guarantee this by stipulating that the 
ideal theory be one that will in fact never be revised 
and so, of course, it cannot be part of anyone's 
knowledge that the ideal theory will be revised. (Of 
course its not being revised may have nothing much to 
do with the ideal theory being ideal—its idealness 
could be on other grounds). 
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